Figure 1: Participant resting on the table of an MRI, coils are placed around the head to measure the MRI signal. In a simple analogy, a camera captures the intensity and color of light to create an image. In an MRI, we use radio waves to excite the molecules in the brain and as the molecules return to rest, the released energy is captured by the MRI coils. Like the intensity and colors in a camera image, the energy from the various molecules in the brain show up with diff erent intensities and contrasts (i.e. colors), creating an image.
Next, a series of low-resolution scans are recorded over time, some during one condition and others during a diff erent condition (see Figure 2 ). For example, some scans might be taken while an individual is telling a lie, while others might be taken while an individual is telling the truth. Th e two sets of scans are later compared to see which areas are more active. When a humanbeing engages in a cognitive activity, such as subtraction, reading, or lying, various parts of the brain become active. Increased mental activity is associated with increased metabolic activity, and that metabolic activity results in an increase in blood fl ow to the area. Th e diff erence in blood fl ow between conditions is called "relative activity". For example, in order to compare relative activity between lie telling and truth telling, we compare the blood fl ow measured when a participant tells a lie to the blood fl ow measured when the same participant tells the truth. Figure 2 . Th e fi rst row depicts a complete T1 weighted scan. In the second row, the brain region has been extracted (BET) from the original scan. T1 weighted scans, a type of structural MRI, are designed to give the best possible picture of the brain's gray matter (see breakout). Th e third row shows one volume from a multivolume fMRI scan. Functional scans are made at much lower resolution than structural scans because time is a factor. Unlike a sMRI which can take as long as 12 minutes, an fMRI volume is measured in around 2-3 seconds. A second diff erence is that the functional BOLD scan is designed to measure blood oxygen.
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Anyone who studies or practices in the fi eld of deception detection will be familiar with this conundrum: How do we determine what a lie is? Th e fMRI off ers no solution to the problem. An informal consensus among researchers is that the act of deception is not a unique cortical process, but the summation of many (some interchangeable) processes in the brain. For the purpose of discussing the how these processes might work, I have proposed a simple framework of the order of cognitive processes that occur when an individual hears a question and then responds deceptively (Figure 3) . Every person has a normal resting state, and pattern of physiological reactivity that is unique. Diverse factors such as physical health, emotional state, drug use, intelligence, and familial support systems all help to shape resting executive control. If a question is asked to which the person intends to lie, attention is directed to the question and cognitive resources are allocated. In addition, information is recalled that relates to the question as well as social decision making information. A decision is made to inhibit the truthful information and present the deceptive information. Th ere is strong evidence that these processes are happening in parallel. For example, it is not always necessary to fully retrieve information from long-term memory before deciding to inhibit it and respond deceptively. As any examiner will note, the polygraph is not a tool for detecting deception, per se. Th e polygraph is a tool for measuring physiological responses. In the same way, a fMRI scan does not measure the brain activity unique to deception. While there is no one region of the brain that is directly associated with deception, there does seem to be a core set of cognitive processes that are associated with the processes involved in lie-telling. However, these processes are also associated with two levels of diffi culty. Similar to the construction of a polygraph examination, a fMRI test must be constructed with attention to detail.
Th ree papers have reviewed the data from fMRI studies of deception (Bhatt et al., 2009; Christ et al., 2009; Vendemia et al., 2009) . Before discussing the studies, a quick note about anatomical names (see Figure 4) . Neuroscientists have diff erent preferences for naming cortical anatomy. Th e fi eld is in a period of rapid growth, and we are learning previously unknown information about the brain. Naming conventions will continue to change as the breadth of our knowledge expands and our ability to map the brain improves. Some researchers have a preference for using Brodmann's Areas which represent numbered regions of the brain divided by the type of neurons in the region and their interconnections. Other researchers prefer a strictly anatomical name which is based soley on the structures of the brain. Th e third group has developed a merging of these naming systems to best represent what we know of the function of the underlying cortex. If you read literature about deception, you will most like see the structures in Figure 4 .
Each of the reviews have focussed on the major studies in the fi eld, and come to similar conclusions. Th e paradigms included modifed versions of the guilty knowledge task, lying about recently acquired knowledge, prepared or spontaneous lyies about past experiences, and lies about recent actions. Christ identifi ed regional brain activity common across the studies in a metaanalysis, and then compared them to areas of the brain associated with three cognitive processes: 1) working memory, 2) inhibitory control, and 3) task switching. Th ese three processes are most consistently reported throughout the deception literature and are supported by measures of reaction time, pupilommetry, galvanic skin response, and brain wave recordings obtained through event-related potentials (ERP). However, for reasons I will explain later the meta-analytic approach is not ideal with the research that has been conducted thus far.
In block design fMRI studies of deception, researchers have associated activations in the caudate (Lee et al., 2002) , cerebellum (Ganis et al., 2003) , cingulate (Mohamed, Faro, Gordon, Platek, Ahmad, & Williams, 2006; Ganis et al., 2003; Lee et al., 2002) , cuneus (Ganis et al., 2003) , fusiform/ parahippocampal area (Ganis et al., 2003; , precental gyrus (Ganis et al., 2003) , ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (Mohamed et al., 2006; Spence et al., 2001) , medial prefrontal cortex (Ganis et al., 2003; Langleben et al., 2002; Spence et al., 2001) , prefrontal cortex (Mohamed et al., 2006; Ganis et al., 2003; Lee et al., 2002) , left frontal (Ganis et al., 2003; Langleben et al., 2002; Spence et al., 2001) , left inferior parietal (Langleben et al., 2002) , (Lee et al., 2002; Spence et al., 2001) , and temporal, (Mohamed et al., 2006; Lee et al., 2002; Stelmack, Houlihan, Doucet, & Belisle, 1994b) regions with the act of deception. Table 1 lists fMRI studies in which participants engaged in deceptive behavior or observed deceptive behavior, and the specifi cs of each paradigm. It is clear that these studies diff er on how participants were "motivated" to deceive, the types of lies they were asked to tell, the type information about which they lied, and the type of polygraph scenario they attempted to parallel. Ganis et al., 2003 Recorded work/vacation scenarios, after 1-week delay generated alternate scenarios and memorized them.
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German et al., 2004
Observers indicated whether real or acted clips revealed completed acts.
Observation only
Grezes et al., 2004
Observers indicated whether actors actually lifted heavy boxes or pretended to lift heavy boxes. Observation only Kozel et al., 2004a For a reward, participants lied and told the truth regarding objects under which $50 was hidden.
Concealed information Kozel et al., 2004b For a reward, participants, lied and told the truth regarding an object under which $50 was hidden.
Concealed information Kozel et al., 2005 For a reward, participants, lied and told the truth regarding an object under which $50 was hidden. Participants were told to lie and tell the truth to events that happened earlier in the day Directed lie to episodic memory Spence et al., 2001 Participants were told to lie and tell the truth to events that happened earlier in the day Directed lie to episodic memory Even given these diff erences, activations in certain regions could be anticipated based on the underlying processes engaged in each study. For example, the studies by Kozel et al. ( , 2004b Kozel et al. ( , 2005 , Langleben et al. (2002) , and Phan et al. (2005) each used a risk-taking scenario in which participants would receive a monetary reward if they "fooled" the examiner, but no reward if they failed to "fool" the examiner. Given this condition, activation could be anticipated in the orbitofrontal cortex, a region of the frontal cortex that has been implicated in the integration of motivational stimuli when guiding response selection (Schoenbaum, Takahashi, Liu, & McDannald, 2011) . Only Kozel identifi ed activation in this region. John Gabrieli and other fMRI researchers argue that the anterior prefrontal cortex, or Brodmann's Area 10, is involved in the act of deception (Gabrieli, July 14, 2005). Ramnani and Owen (2004) argue that this area is activated when an individual must make simultaneous considerations of multiple relations. When an individual deceives, these multiple relations may occur between situational context, goal-driven behavior, divergence of the deceptive information from truthful information, and a variety of internal states. Given the generalist nature of these "simultaneous considerations, " it is no surprise that several researchers have identifi ed activation in this region during the act of deception (Bhatt et al., 2009; Ganis et al., 2003; Lee et al., 2002; Mohamed et al., 2006; Vendemia, & Buzan, 2004a; ) . However, the most widely reported region of activation is the anterior cingulate (Vendemia, & Buzan, 2004b; Spence et al., 2001) . Th is activation is broken down into two main areas, the ventral anterior cingulate and the dorsal anterior cingulate. Some researchers believe that this area is involved in confl ict resolution, while others believe that it is involved in attention shifting and resource allocation processes. It is possible that the more ventral regions are involved in confl ict resolution, while the more dorsal area is involved in attention shifting. It is theoretically probable that the act of deception involves both processes. Bhatt's (2009) review of the brain regions activated in fMRI studies noted that the group activations reported in the studies were quite varied (activation between truthful groups and deceptive groups). Vendemia et al., (2009) evaluated the intersubject variability between the studies fi nding that the general diff erences in brain activation between participants was greater than that between truthful and deceptive responding. At fi rst the variability seems overwhelming, but this variability is exactly what research with the fMRI is designed to identify. Th e polygraph is a reliable measure of autonomic nervous system responses, and it is very robust. Any variety of test formats produce similar results, even though the formats measure diff erent aspects of cognition, attention, and emotion. Th e reason the tests are robust is that autonomic system responses result from the combination of cognitive processes. Very similar patterns of results can be the results of diff erent combinations of cognitive processes. For example, the guilty knowledge ("concealed information") test depends on the presentation of the infrequent "relevant" item among high frequency irrelevant items. Extensive research with the infrequent/frequent paradigm with other measures of cortical activity suggest that "the expectation of the infrequent stimulus" drives the autonomic system activity. When the anticipated infrequent stimulus occurs and the rare information is recognized a particular brainwave, the oddball P300, occurs (Allen & Iacono, 1997; Allen et al., 1992; Farwell & Donchin, 1991; Rosenfeld et al., 1999) . Particular cognitive functions associated with the identifi cation of the infrequent stimulus include attention resource allocation (Comerchero & Polich, 1999) , and the consequential updating of information held in working memory (Donchin & Coles, 1988; Ruchkin et al., 1990) . During probable lie format exams, in which relevant questions are embedded in between pairs of "probably lie" questions that are then intermingled with irrelevant questions, waveforms associated with recall of information (N4) and switching between high and low diffi culty conditions occur (Meek, Phillips, Boswell, & Vendemia, 2013; Schillaci & Vendemia, 2014; Vendemia, Schillaci, Buzan, Green, & Meek, 2009 ). Using fMRI, along with other technologies and techniques, we can begin to parcel the specifi c cortical activity that occurs during the act of deception. Th e task is far from simple, and the studies conducted thus far are rife with errors in test construction. Th ey repeat errors that occurred in the early 1990's with the fi rst studies of brain wave measures of deception which repeated errors in the fi rst designs of polygraph tests. In addition to errors in design, fMRI tests are susceptible to a variety of errors.
Noise related to people. Within subject noise can occur any time a subject moves inside the MRI scanner. Respiratory and cardiac artifacts can also create within subject noise during scans, as can attentional modulation, changes in cognitive strategy, drugs and medications, anxiety, and countermeasures. Factors related to within subject noise are also consistently present in between subject noise. Whenever a diff erence occurs between participants that is not related to the task, it enters into a class of error called between subject noise. Variability in how the brain's anatomy, diff erences in hemoglobin concentrations, cytoarchitectonic variability (how the diff erent parts of the brain are connected during development), and variability in venous drainage patterns are all factors of between subjects noise. Other factors such as how much information a person can maintain at any given moment in time, working memory, are also considered between subject noise if the experimenter has not considered them. An example of the impact of such a variable can be observed in a study in which we tested the verbal memory in 19 participants who then performed a deception task in the fMRI. All were scans collected at 3T with Siemens Magnetom Trio System using T2* weighted echoplanar images sensitive to blood oxygen levels were acquired during the functional scans (gradient echo; TR = 2490 ms; TE = 30 ms; image matrix = 64 X 64; in-plane resolution = 208 X 208 mm; slice thickness = 3.2 mm). Voxel-wise analysis was carried out using fl exible hemodynamic response function (HRF) modeling, allowing HRF to vary spatially and between subjects. (Woolrich 2004) . Analysis was carried out using FEAT (FMRI Expert Analysis Tool) Version 5.63, part of FSL (FMRIB's Software Library, www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl). Time-series statistical analysis was carried out using FILM with local autocorrelation correction (Woolrich 2001). Z (Gaussianised T/F) statistic images were thresholded using clusters determined by Z>2.3 and a (corrected) cluster signifi cance threshold of P=0.05 (Worsley 1992). Registration to high resolution and/or standard images was carried out using FLIRT (Jenkinson 2001 (Jenkinson , 2002 . Participants with lower scores on verbal working memory had greater relative activation in the left middle frontal gyrus while responding deceptively than those with higher scores (Figure 5) . Th e fi nding is critical as the left middle frontal gyrus is a common fi nding in fMRI studies of deception. If participants who have poor working memory skills show greater activation in deception relative to truth telling than any study that reports left frontal middle activation without accounting for the eff ect verbal working memory is potentially confounded. Paradigm Noise. Issues with between paradigm noise arise from inconsistent defi nitions of types of deception being used in paradigms, diff erences in stimuli presented (rate, number, and type), diff erences in the type of memory involved, and diff erences in reward/punishment scenarios. We studied a very simple aspect of stimulus presentation in the fMRI by having participants respond deceptively on diff erent percentages of the trials. Participants were 89 undergraduate college students (61 females, Mean age = 20.9 yrs, SD = 3.45). Ethnicity breakdown : 78% Caucasian, 8% AfricanAmerican, 3% Asian, 2% Hispanic, 3% identifi ed as Other, 5% did not report. An event-related paradigm was implemented with 200 trials of the twostimulus type being presented. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions, 20% Lie (N = 15), 50% Lie (N = 21), or 80% Lie (N=21).
Th ese N's represent the fi nal numbers, as participants were thrown out for too much motion or accuracies below 85% before analyses. As can be seen in Figure 6 relative activity in the anterior cingulate and parietal cortex was signifi cantly greater when participants responded on 50% of the trials as compared to 20% of the trials. Activity in the anterior cingulate is the primary fi nding in fMRI studies of deception. Th e eff ect of this small paradigm manipulation has crucial implications. First, it is critical to know what is the mechanism causes anterior cingulate action. Second researchers must be clear about how frequently participants told lies; of the previous research studies reviewed for this paper several did not contain enough information to determine how often their participants told lies. Of those papers in which the information was available the participants were deceptive on 10% to 80% of trials. Figure 6 . Patterns of relative brain activation when participants respond deceptively as compared to truthfully. In the top panel, participants responded deceptively on 20% of the trials. In the second panel participants responded deceptively on 50% of the trials. Th e bottom panels shows the specifi c regions that were activated more in the 50% condition than in the 20% condition.
